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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
JOHN ELWOOD DENNETT, 
Plaintiff and Respondent 
vs. 
FIRST SECURITY BANK OF UTAH, N.A., 
in its capacity as Administrator of the 
Estate of Jacob R. Green, deceased, 
and JACOB R. GREEN II original adminis-
trator of the estate of Jacob R. 
Green I, deceased, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
No. 
10912 
This is an action for attorney's fees against the admin-
istrator and original administrator of the Estate of Jacob 
R. Green I. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Defendants moved to dismiss plaintiff's complaint on 
the ground that the merits of this case had been adjudicated 
2 
by the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, in the matter of the Estate of Jacob 
R. Green I. The trial court ordered that the record in the 
matter of the Estate of Jacob R. Green I be made a part of 
the record in this case. The trial court denied defendantq' 
motion to dismiss. The defendants' petition for an inter. 
mediate appeal to the court was granted. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The defendants seek a reversal of the order denying 
their motion to dismiss. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
John Elwood Dennett appearing prose filed a complaint 
(R-1-4) in which he alleges in substance as follows: 
Jacob R. Green II as administrator of the estate of 
Jacob R. Green I originally contracted with plaintiff for his 
services as attorney. First Security Bank of Utah, N.A. was 
successor administrator and became bound to the original 
administrator's obligations for plaintiff's attorney's fees. 
The compensation the plaintiff was to receive "while not 
discussed in terms of percentages, was to be a contingent 
compensation, with nothing to be owed by the heirs in case 
of an unsuccessful attempt, and with the plaintiff to recover 
a reasonable percentage in case the plaintiff was successful 
in achieving disallowance of the will and an intestacy pro-
bate." A fee of one-third of the estate would be reasonable 
under the circumstances. 
In plaintiff's complaint he prays for judgment against 
the defendants as administrators of the estate of .Jacob R. 
Green I in the amount of $6,750.00 for extraordinary serv-
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ices rendered, together with $970.00 usual probate fee 
awarded for the services rendered by decree of the Third 
Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah, in the matter of the Estate of Jacob R. Green I. 
The defendants moved to dismiss plaintiff's complaint 
upon the grounds of failure to state a claim upon which 
relief may be granted, res judicata and collateral estoppel. 
(R-5-9) 
In support of defendants' motion, defendants caused the 
record in the matter of the Estate of Jacob R. Green I to be 
made a part of the record in this case. (R-10) 
In the matter of the Estate of Jacob R. Green I there 
was a contest between the defendants and the plaintiff con-
cerning the amount of plaintiff's fees. In a petition by the 
plaintiff for allowance of extraordinary fees to the District 
Court of the Third Judicial District in and for Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, the plaintiff, pro se, asserted a claim 
the same as he, pro se, asserts in the complaint in the case 
at bar (R130-132). At hearings on his petition for attorney's 
lees he said : 
"The petition, that is myself acting in this capa-
city as a petitioner, rests." (R-181) 
The defendant, First Security Bank of Utah, N.A., as 
administrator of the estate of Jacob R. Green I, filed an 
amended petition for third and final account including 
therein an answer to the plaintiff's petition. That answer 
1'ontained an admission and denial of plaintiff's petition. 
The defendant, First Security Bank, as administrator, al-
leged: 
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IX 
"That the normal and usual fee for the services 
rendered by counsel would be $970.00, that with re. 
spect to this amount, the administrator acknowled , 
the estate's liability . . . ges 
x 
"That certain extraordinary services were rend-
ered by the estate's counsel, the extent and value of 
which are not entirely known to the administrator 
and with respect to which the court should make ~ 
determination which would be fair and equitable to 
both counsel and the heirs of the estate. A separatk 
petition has been filed by counsel detailing the serv-
ices he claims." (R-135-136) 
At the hearings on the petition of John Elwood Dennett 
and answer of First Security Bank of Utah, N.A. as admin-
istrator, the defendant, Jacob R. Green II was present. 
(R-154 & 157). The plaintiff testified in support of the 
allegations he made in his verified petition. (R-158-176) 
Mr. Dennett called an expert witness to support his petition. 
He was Mr. Richard Bird, Jr., Esq. whose firm subsequently 
appeared at a hearing as Mr. Dennett's attorneys. (R-176 & 
185) The defendant, First Security Bank of Utah, N.A., as 
administrator appeared through its trust officer, Mr. Brent 
Hortin. (R-154) Jacob R. Green II appeared and objected to 
Mr. Dennett's claim (R-157) and consented to the court'~ 
hearing the issue of Mr. Dennett's attorney's fees. (R-183) 
All of the parties in the case at bar were present at the 
hearings on Mr. Dennett's petition for attorney's fees in the 
matter of the Estate of Jacob R. Green I. All of the parties 
p 
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submitted to the jurisdiction of that court for the adjudica-
tion of reasonable attorney's fees. (R-183) 
The court, Judge Bryant H. Croft presiding, made find-
ings of fact and conclusions of law and entered a decree. 
(R-149-151) The plaintiff was awarded a regular fee of 
$970.00 and extraordinary fee of $985.00. (R-150) 
At the last hearing on the petition of the plaintiff con-
cerning attorney's fees Mr. William D. Oswald, Esq. of the 
same firm as Mr. Richard Bird, Jr. appeared as one of Mr. 
Dennett's attorneys. 
Mr. Dennett's attorney represented to the court: 
" ... It is my understanding in my conversation 
with him (Mr. Dennett) he discussed with you (the 
Judge) the possibility of changing your finding to 
show that the attorneys fee allowed Mr. Dennett will 
be changed to show that they were allowed to the ad-
ministrator of the estate. And now it's our feeling 
that our best course would be to appeal to the Su-
preme Court without changing any of the findings . 
. . . (W) e do not wish to make any change in the 
findings or decree." (R-185) 
The court responded (R-185) : 
"Oh, that's fine. I would like to make a state-
ment into the record so that there will be something 
for your guidance as well as that of the Supreme 
Court and in regards to the ruling I made concern-
ing the allowance of attorneys fees in this case. 
"There were two aspects of the case that formed 
a basis for the allowance of the attorney's fee. One 
was the fact that some work was done in the State of 
Iowa to recover a portion of the estate of the de-
cedent that was in that state for the heirs. It's my 
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understanding that the - as a consequence of the 
efforts to some extent of Mr. Dennett, to some extent 
of the First Security Bank as administrator of th 
estate of Jacob R. Green in Utah, and largely throug~ 
the efforts of Attorney Ed Dailey in Iowa, they were 
able to effect a settlement there and recover for the 
heirs an estate that was not left to the heirs of some 
$6,935.85. They paid to Attorney Ed Dailey the sum 
of $1,000.00 attorney's fee, so that it would appear 
that the recovery through the action in Iowa totaled 
$7,935.85 counting the $1,000.00 attorney's fee that 
was paid to Ed Dailey. 
"Now the issue there as here, to a lesser degree, 
was the competency of Jacob R. Green to make the 
will, he having been declared an incompetent by the 
court in Salt Lake County, this court, long before he 
made the wills involved. At the time he made the 
wills involved, he was the ward of a guardian under 
a guardianship proceeding in this court, and conse-
quently when he moved to Iowa, after having been 
declared an incompetent by this court, where he died, 
they attempted to probate a will that he had executed 
after he had been declared mentally incompetent. 
"In a negotiated settlement, I believe between 
Mr. Dailey and the attorneys for the administrator 
in Iowa, the heirs received, as I indicated, some 
$6,935.85 in assets, and Dailey was paid a Thousand 
Dollars. Now just how much work Mr. Dennett did 
on that case, I'm not sure. In his testimony, and his 
testimony was very general in nature, he spoke of 
many hours of work and nothing really to support it 
The bank, as a matter of fact, did a lot of the negotia-
tions with Ed Dailey in Iowa as the administrator 
out here. Be that as it may, in fixing a fee, I vi ewe~ 
the Iowa recovery as, in effect, an accomplishment of 
recovering something like you might in a judgment, 
and so I computed Mr. Dennett's fee on the basis of 
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twenty-five per cent of the amount the heirs in Utah 
received from the Iowa estate plus a Thousand Dol-
lars paid to Mr. Dailey to come up with an attorney's 
fee of $1,984.00. And from that, of course, I deducted 
the $1,000.00 paid Dailey leaving Mr. Dennett 
$984.00 of the fee. 
"Now what that is, of course, is a twenty-five 
per cent fee on the recovery divided between two 
attorneys, Mr. Dailey doing most of the work in 
Iowa, and Mr. Dennett doing some part of the work 
here in Utah. 
"Now with respect to the estate in Utah, the fee 
I allowed Mr. Dennett here based upon an estate that 
is slightly less than $20,000.00 was the standard fee 
fixed by the State Bar Association for an estate of 
this size. And the reason I didn't allow any additional 
extraordinary fee on the Utah estate was because 
from my review of the file it was apparent to me that 
there wasn't any extraordinary effort required in 
probating the estate. There was a petition filed to 
have the will declared void because Green was in-
competent at the time he executed it, and the court 
entered a default judgment because the Iowa admin-
istrator didn't make an appearance when the time 
was set for trial and declared the will invalid. Well, 
I don't view that particular effort on the part of Mr. 
Dennett as being a great extraordinary service be-
cause he merely had to file a petition asking that the 
will be declared void because Green was incompetent 
when he executed it as declared by this court. And, 
of course, that was the decree that this court entered. 
When I say, 'this court,' I don't mean me. I mean the 
District Court of Salt ake County entering-declar-
ing the will of Jacob R. Green void because he was, 
in fact, incompetent and under a guardianship of this 
court at the time he executed the will. 
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"Now under the circumstances, I don't see th t 
the ac~ievem_ent, _if it can be c~lled an achievemen~, 
of havmg this will declared void by this court wa~ 
one that required any extraordinary services on th: 
part of Mr. Dennett. 
"The petition for the probate of the estate in 
Utah was filed on November 14, 1961. He filed a 
petition on behalf of Jacob R. Green II asking that 
Jacob R. Green be appointed administrator of the 
estate here. The administrator of the estate in the 
Iowa court in Des Moines had, in fact, filed an 
Answer to this petition. 
"On April 13, 1962, Judge Van Cott signed an 
Order directing that the trial of the issues of the 
estate in Utah be held on April 24, 1962, and that a 
copy of this order be served on the attorney for the 
estate in Iowa, the Answer filed by the Iowa admin-
istrator having asked for ancillary proceedings in 
Utah. Of course, the Iowa administrator did not ap-
pear on April 24th, and the court appointed Jacob R. 
Green, II the administrator of the estate here. ThiR 
order was finally presented to Judge Van Cott for 
signature on July 27, 1962. 
On January 23, 1963, the bank filed a consent to 
serve as a substitute administrator, and the bank was 
appointed substitute administrator pursuant to r, 
petition filed by Mr. Dennett on behalf of the estate. 
At least, I assume it was filed by Mr. Dennett. His 
signature doesn't appear upon it, but it is signed by 
Jacob R. Green. 
"Now a Petition for First and Final Account-
ing, Petition for Approval of Administration, for 
Ratification of Disbursement and Acts, and for R~­
lease and Discharge as Administrator was f~!,ed 
March 21, 1963 and prepared by Mr. Dennett, • ru 
l 
I 
I 
I 
9 
sure. It's a one-page petition with a typewritten 
schedule attached. 
"There was an Order signed approving that ac-
count by Judge Hansen on April 8, 1963. A Notice to 
Creditors was not published until May 17, 1963, the 
last date of publication being June 7, 1963, and I be-
lieve that was published at the - through the effort 
of the administrator. 
"It's my understanding from Mr. Hortin at the 
bank that the inventory and appraisement was pre-
pared by the bank when filed October 31, 1963, about 
two years after the original petition was filed. 
"There was a subsequent Petition for First Ac-
counting Approval and for Leave to Make Partial 
Distribution filed November 30, 1965. A Decree of 
Partial Distribution was entered December 21, 1965. 
"There is an Order signed granting Leave to 
Contract with respect to Real Property that was 
signed in May - May 26th of 1966. And then, of 
course, the final amended Petition of the Admin-
istrator for Approval of Third and Final Account 
which was originally prepared by Mr. Dennett and 
which I, personally, almost rewrote myself and told 
him what he would have to put in it before I would 
approve it. 
"I fail to see in this estate in Utah that there 
was any great amount of work involved. It was a 
simple estate for less than $20,000.00, had no com-
plications whatsoever as far as I can see, and I 
couldn't see any justification whatsoever for any 
extraordinary fee in this estate. 
"Now I don't know what Mr. Dennett may have 
done - and I heard his testimony - and, again, with 
respect to his activities here, it was very general. He 
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talked in terms of many, many hours, but he didr,'t 
have any records to back up what he was saying. A d 
my review of the file, as far as I am concerned doll 
not reflect a complicated case that justifies an ~xtr:~ 
ordinary fee. I don't think in any sense of the word 
that he, in effect, recovered a $20,000.00 estate for 
the heirs in Utah. We had $20,000.00 - a $20,000.00 
estate left in Utah by Jacob Green subject to probate 
here, which was probated in routine fashion albeit 
drug out over more than a five-year period, or at 
least a five-year period. 
"Now after reviewing the file carefully and 
hearing the bank, and the bank as administrator 
testified, as I recall, at least there is something in the 
record to indicate, that they had done a substantial 
amount of the work required to get the inventory 
ready and filed as well as efforts that were put forth 
afterwards to get the estate closed. And I am not 
convinced at all that this is an estate that required 
any great amount of work over and above the routine 
work required of any attorney in probate of an estate 
of this size. And the fact that he has filed three ac-
countings in this estate doesn't suggest to me that it 
required a great effort on his part, but, rather, it was 
a rather indifferent handling of the estate, because 
I see nothing in the proceedings here at all that was 
complicated or that required any five-year drag out 
of getting the estate administered and closed. 
"For those reasons, and I say to you, I reviewed 
the file from cover to cover and outlined it making 
notes, I came to the conclusion that the ordinary fee 
allowable by the State Bar Schedule as far as the 
Utah estate was concerned was all that he was en-
titled to. 
"I might say that he was the attorney for the 
guardian prior to the time that Jacob Green died for 
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a brief period of time. I think for less than a year, at 
least if my memory serves me. 
"I reviewed the guardianship file also in connec-
tion with this case, and, of course, he was paid an-
other fee for his work in the guardianship estate. So 
all of the work he did prior to the death of Jacob 
Green as attorney for the guardianship estate, I 
think he was paid in that estate, and I think a sub-
stantial amount of the work that he did in the Jacob 
Green matter involved work that he did as attorney 
for the guardian rather than attorney for the estate. 
"There was some complaint made when we had 
the hearing here that heirs of Jacob Green made 
many efforts to try and contact him. They would go 
down to his office and rather than see them, he would 
go out the back door and not see them. Well, he had 
his explanation for it, but I don't see, in any sense of 
the word, he is entitled to any extraordinary fee of 
the estate probated in this court. 
"Now I have taken the time to give you that in-
formation and the reason that was back of the allow-
ance of the fee that I made in this case because other-
wise I think the Supreme Court is in no position to 
know what was back of the fee. Now I don't know 
whether you would propose in taking this matter to 
the Supreme Court to include what I have put into 
the record today as my reasons for determining the 
fee that I did or not, but I dare say that if you don't, 
the bank will, and I think the Supreme Court is en-
titled to know the reasons why I came up with the 
fee that I did in this case. 
"Now if you have any questions, I will be glad 
to answer them." 
"MR. OSWALD: No, Your Honor." 
12 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM IN HIS COMPLAINT IS 
RES JUD/CATA. THE DECREE OF THE THIRD 
JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT 
LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, ADJUDICAT. 
ING THE AMOUNT OF FEE TO WHICH PLAIN. 
TIFF WAS ENTITLED FOR HIS SERVICES TO DE. 
FENDANTS IS CONCLUSIVE. 
A review of the record for comparing the parties and 
issues in the matter of the Estate of Jacob R. Green I and in 
the complaint on file in the case at bar reveals: 
(a) Identical cause of action 
(b) Identical persons and parties to the actions 
(c) Identical persons for or against whom claims are 
made 
(d) Adjudication by the Third Judicial District Court 
in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, of 
plaintiff's claim in the matter of the Estate oi 
Jacob R. Green I prior to his filing the complaint 
in the case at bar. 
(e) Adjudication by a court of competent jurisdiction 
The enumerated elements of res judicata are clearly 
contained within the record in the case at bar. The judicial 
power and jurisdiction of the District Court to adjudicate 
plaintiff's claim in the matter of the Estate of Jacob R. 
Green I are not in doubt. 
In a previous decision by this court, in re Agee's Estat··, 
69 U. 130, 252 P. 891 (1927), the probate division of a Ut8h 
13 
1 District Court was found to have the same constitutionally 
vested judicial power and jurisdiction as the other divisions, 
if any, of a District Court. In that case an attorney for 
the 8dministrator of an estate filed a petition with the 
District Court's probate division as follows: to fix and allow 
ccifain amounts as fees, to approve and allow certain costs 
,,,1\:mced, to direct the administrator to pay forthwith to 
the petitioner his fees for legal services rendered and to 
impress a lien on certain amounts in favor of petitioner. 
Th2 administrator filed a pleading in the nature of a de-
murrer which challenged the sufficiency of the attorney's 
petition on the ground that the District Court's probate 
division had no jurisdiction over the subject matter. The 
District Court dismissed the petition of the attorney. This 
court reversed and remanded with directions to the District 
Court. The rationale of this court in that case squarely ap-
plies to the issues in the case at bar. It is the landmark Utah 
ease roncerning these issues. This court said : 
"Respondent makes the further contention that 
appellant's cause of action, if any he has, is against 
the administrator personally, and not against the 
estate. Such, no doubt, is the rule in ordinary cases 
of administration. Upon this point respondent's 
counsel call our attention to many cases . The 
exceptions to the rule are also stated ... " 
". . . we are convinced that this is a case in 
which the fund is primarily liable for whatever 
amount is reasonably due the appellant for his serv-
ices, in its behalf, and that appellant is entitled to 
maintain an action therefor against the administra-
tor of the estate as such. 
"This brings us to the last and perhaps most im-
portant question in the case. It is contended by re-
14 
spondent that the district court in a probate proce d-
ing was without jurisdiction to hear and determ~ _ 
the cause .... Is the district court, in the exercise~~ 
probate powers, a court of competent jurisdiction? · 
* * * * 
". . . we will quote another passage from 
Woerner, vol. 2, p. 1185: 
'In view of the ultimate liability of the estate for 
the disbursements made in its behalf by the executor 
or administrator, and of the duty incumbent upon 
the probate court to pass upon the question of the 
reasonableness of the charges, as well as of the Jia. 
bility of the estate, it would seem that original juris. 
diction to adjudicate between executors or admin-
istrators and their creditors for services in respect of 
the estate should, on principle, be vested in the pro. 
bate courts, to avoid circuity of action and unneces-
sary costs and delay, and there seems to be legislative 
and judicial tendency in that direction, particularly 
in the western states.' 
"The cases cited sustain the text. 
"The sections of the Probate Code referred to 
are as follows : 
'7872. [75-14-17] All issues of fact joined in pro-
bate and guardianship proceedings must be tried in 
conformity with the requirements of the Code of 
Civil Procedure, and in all such proceedings the 
party affirming is the plaintiff, and the one denying 
or avoiding is defendant. Judgments therein, on the 
issue joined, as well as for costs, may be entered a~d 
enforced by execution or otherwise by the court as m 
civil actions.' 
'7873. [75-14-18] If no jury is demanded t?e 
court or judge must try the issues joined. If on writ-
15 
ten demand a jury is called by either party, and the 
issues are not sufficiently made up by the written 
pleadings on file, the court may direct the prepara-
tion of more specific pleadings, or, on due notice to 
the opposite party, may settle and frame the issues to 
be tried, and submit the same, together with the evi-
dence of each party, to the jury. If the trial of the 
issues joined requires the examination of an account, 
the court or judge must try the matter or refer it, 
and no jury can be called.' 
"As further illustrating the powers of the court 
in probate proceedings, we quote the following sec-
'7558. [75-1-6] The district and Supreme Courts 
and the judges thereof sitting in probate and guard-
ianship matters shall exercise all such powers, con-
sistent with the provisions of this title, as are or may 
be conferred upon those courts or judges, respective-
ly, in other proceedings; and, except as otherwise 
provided in this title, the provisions of the Code of 
Civil Procedure shall be applicable to and constitute 
the rules of practice in probate and guardianship 
proceedings.' 
* * * * 
"In the Hazlett Case the syllabus is as follows: 
'Attorneys, who under employment by executors 
of a will, render necessary services beneficial to the 
testator's estate in the settlement thereof, may, in a 
proper case, file with the county court an itemized 
bill for their compensation, and the county court has 
authority to allow a reasonable amount for that pur-
pose as a claim against the estate, where those in con-
trol of it refuse to pay the claim and object to any 
allowance therefor.' 
"In the state of Nebraska, under the Constitu-
tion and statutes of the state, the county court, in the 
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settlement of estates of decedents, has the powers uf 
a court of chancery. See Hazlett Case, page 591 189 
Neb. 372). In this state the district court is a court 
of general jurisdiction. It exercises probate powers 
which, in most jurisdictions of the country, are exer'. 
cied separately by another court. The jurisdiction of 
our district courts is lucidly explained by Mr. Justici: 
Frick in the case of Weyant v. Utah Sav. & Trust Co 
54 Utah 181, 182 P.189 9 A.L.R. 1119. Counsel fo~ 
appellant quote from the opinion the following lan-
guage, found on pages 203, 204 (182 P. 198). 
'There is, however, no such court as a probate 
court in this state. The only courts having general-
we may say universal-original jurisdiction are the 
district courts, all of which are created by our Con-
stitution. Upon those courts, in the language of ar-
ticle 8, section 7, of our Constitution, is conferred 
"original jurisdiction in all matters civil and crim-
inal, not excepted in this Constitution, and not pro-
hibited by law." Neither the Constitution or the law8 
of this state prohibit those courts from exercising 
original jurisdiction to any extent. * * * 
'The district courts of this state are therefore 
invested with jurisdiction in probate matters pre-
cisely the same as they are invested with all other 
civil and criminal jurisdiction. They transact probate 
business as they do all other civil business. True, in 
administering estates they follow the established law 
and rules of procedure applicable to those matters, 
the same as they follow the established law and rules 
of procedure applicable to so-called equity or la\: 
cases. Moreover, our Constitution provides thai 
"there shall be but one form of action, and law and 
equity may be administered in the same action." ~'e 
therefore have ... courts possessed of general orig-
inal jurisdiction, which are known as district courts. 
The district courts of this state, therefore, admm· 
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ister the estates of decedents as a part of their orig-
inal jurisdiction, the same as they hear and enter 
judgments on promissory notes, or enter decrees in 
equity, foreclosing mortgages or quieting titles.' 
* * * 
"In the case of In re Reiser's Estate, 57 Utah 
434, 195 P. 317, the jurisdiction of the district court 
in a probate proceeding was challenged by the ad-
ministratrix of an estate, who claimed that the mat-
ter in controversy had not been theretofore adjudi-
cated ... 
* * * * 
"In the course of the opinion, the court, at page 
441 (195 P. 320) says: 
'Without denying the power of the district court 
to hear and determine a question of this kind, even 
when exercising the powers of a probate court, we 
feel compelled to hold that there should be some ap-
propriate pleading to invoke the jurisdiction and 
power of the court.' 
"The court then quotes the following excerpt 
from In re Tripp's Estate, 51 Utah, 359, 170 P. 975: 
* * * * 
'There seems to be no reason, under our Consti-
tution and laws, why a district court in a probate 
proceeding may not when necessary to a due admin-
istration of an estate exercise powers which ordinar-
ily pertain to equity jurisdiction so that the business 
may proceed without interruption or unnecessary 
delay.' 
"While the identical question presented here has 
not been heretofore determined by this court, it must 
be conceded from the legislation and decisions to 
which we have referred that the tendency is in the 
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direction of disregarding mere technical distinction' 
relating to the powers of a district court when exer~ 
cising jurisdiction in probate proceedings. 
" ... The court, has thus far found no substantial 
reasons for holding that the district courts, in the 
exercise of probate powers, may not determine such 
questions as they arise during the course of admin-
istration. It is held, however, that the pleadings in 
such cases must be such as to invoke the jurisdiction 
of the court. Section 7873, supra, of the Probate Code 
contemplates recasting the pleadings when necessary 
for the trial of such questions as arise under section 
7872. 
* * * 
" ... it is our opinion that it was the manifest 
intention of the legislature, in enacting the Probate 
Code, to simplify our judicial procedure so as to avoid 
unnecessary circuity of actions in administering the 
estates of decedents. 
"The judgment is therefore reversed ... Appel-
lant to recover costs. 
"GIDEON, C. J., and FRICK, J. concur. 
"CHERRY, J. I. concur in the result. The doc-
trine that claims for services rendered in the admin-
istration of the estates of deceased persons, at the 
instance and request of administrators, are merely 
claims against the administrator individually, and 
cannot be made charges upon the estate of the de-
ceased except indirectly through the administrator, 
is an artificial doctrine, resting on no substantial 
basis. Its practical application often results in dela!" 
circuity of action, uncertainty, and injustice. Ma?Y 
courts have rejected it .... I think the doctrine in-
consistent with the Probate Code of this state. Comp. 
Laws Utah 1917, §§ 7643, 7644 and 7666, very clearly 
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imply that expenses of administration are not only 
charges but preferred charges against the estate. The 
matter of the lien asserted by petitioner is immate-
rial. If the petitioner has a claim at all against the 
estate, it is for expenses of administration, which, 
by the statute, has preference in the order of pay-
ment. 
" ... There is very respectable authority for the 
proposition that claims for attorney's fees for serv-
ices performed in the course of administration may 
be allowed by the probate court and ordered paid 
directly to the attorney performing the service. In 
addition to Hazlett v. Moore, 89 Neb. 372, 131 N.W. 
589, cited in the majority opinion, see U.S.P. & G. Co. 
v. People, 44 Colo. 557, 98 P. 828; People v. El Paso 
Co. Ct., 7 4 Colo. 123, 219 P. 215; in re McLure's 
Estate, 68 Mont. 556, 220 P. 527; Knight v. Hamak-
er, 40 Or. 424, 67 P. 107. In California, the proceed-
ing is authorized by statute. Kerr's Cyc. Codes, Cal. 
1616. This form of proceedings is simple, direct, and 
sensible, and ought to have judicial sanction, especi-
ally since this court is not committed to the contrary. 
This does not mean that the scope of probate pro-
ceedings may be enlarged to include the adjudication 
of disputes relating to contracts with or claims 
against the deceased or to controversies over the title 
or possession of estate property. Because the matter 
in hand relates to expenses of administration, a sub-
ject directly connected with and arising out of the 
proceedings over which the probate court has con-
trol, and which it must adjudicate in any event with 
the administrator, it becomes a peculiar and appro-
priate subject of cognizance in the probate proceed-
ings, for which reasons I approve the reversal of the 
judgment. 
"STRAUP, J., concurs in the views expressed 
by CHERRY, J." 
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This court reaffirmed its rationale in Agee's Estate and 
followed it in Rice's Estate, 111 U. 428, 182 P.2d 11 
(1947). 
1 
This author prefers the position of Justices Straub and 
Cherry in Agee's Estate, supra. Whether this court follows 
the majority or the concurring opinion in that case, it is 
clear from the record that the Third Judicial District Court•8 
probate division was a court of competent jurisdiction. Its 
jurisdiction was invoked by John Elwood Dennett'R petition 
for attorney's fees answered by admissions and denials by 
First Security Bank and by the appearance of the defendant 
' 
Jacob R. Green II at the hearing on Mr. Dennett's claim 
wherein he objected to Dennett's petition and consented to 
submitting himself to the jurisdiction of the court to adjudi-
cate the issue after being thoroughly advised by the court 
that he could have a continuance for the purposes of obtain-
1 
ing legal counsel. (R-157-183) 
All of the elements of res judicata existed within the 
proceedings on Mr. Dennett's petition for attorney's fees in 
the matter of the Estate of Jacob R. Green I. The plaintiff's 
claim in his complaint in the case at bar is res judicata. 
POINT II 
THE PAINTIFF IS ESTOPPED FROM COLLATER· 
ALLY ATTACKING THE DECREE OF THE THIRD 
JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT 
LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, WHEREIN HE 
IS AWARDED FEES FOR LEGAL SERVICES 
RENDERED TO DEFENDANTS 
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The decree of the District Court, probate division, in 
the matter of the Estate of Jacob R. Green I is not subject to 
collateral attack. The controlling case decided by this court 
is Erickson v. McCullough, 91 U. 159, 63 P.2d 595, 109 
A.L.lL 332 ( 1937). In that case the plaintiff, Erickson, a 
minor, by his guardian ad litem, Tanner, took action against 
Salt Lake attorneys, McCullough & Callister. Said attorneys 
had been employed by the minor's mother to prosecute a 
claim for the minor against Arctic Ice Company. The guard-
ian ad Jitem in the case against the ice company was the 
mother. After tentative settlement of the claim with the de-
fendant, Arctic Ice Company, the mother petitioned for 
letters of guardianship and authority as general guardian to 
pay attorneys fees to McCullough & Callister in the sum of 
i3,708.00. The plaintiff, Erickson, by his guardian ad litem, 
Tanner, sought to cancel the allowance of attorneys fees in 
1 the guardianship proceeding and sought judgment against 
the attorneys for the amount of fees they had received or 
attorneys fees which had been allowed. Plaintiff contended 
that the attorneys fees were excessive, illegal, inequitable 
and unconscionable. The defendant's attorneys, McCullough 
& Callister, demurred to the plaintiff's complaint. This court 
held that the award of attorneys fees in guardianship and 
probate matters is not subject to collateral attack except for 
Jurisdictional reasons. The court said : 
"Appellant, however, further submits questions 
relating to the contract for attorneys' fees and the 
power of the guardian ad litem to bind the infant. 
The court having acquired jurisdiction of the person 
and estate of the minor, these questions become col-
lateral and may be successfully urged in a collateral 
attack only if the order making the appointment of 
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the guardian of the minor is void for want of ju ·. 
diction. It is contended that the probate court mr~. 
an order allowing an attorneys' fee without hear~ e 
or t~king any evidence relative to the value of~~! 
services. The probate court having ecquired jurisdic-
tion of a cause, its orders and judgments are nre. 
sumed to be based upon evidence, stipulations or ~ro. 
ceedings sufficient to support such orders or judg. 
men ts." 
POINT III 
PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT FAILS TO STATE A 
CAUSE OF ACTION FOR ANYTHING OTHER 
THAN A REASONABLE ATTORNEYS FEE FOR 
SERVICES RENDERED WHICH HAS BEEN AD-
JUDICATED AND WHICH MUST BE RECOVERED 
BY PROCEEDINGS SUPPLEMENTARY TO THE 
DECREE AWARDING HIM HIS FEE 
It is elementary hornbook law that when a contract does 
not contain an essential term such as the amount of compfn 
sation for attorney's services and the attorney renders serr. 
ices, the amount of compensation is implied. It is a reasm1• 
able amount. 7 Am.Jur.2d §§ 235, 250, pp. 183, 187 
In his complaint Mr. Dennett alleges : 
'"While not discussed in terms of percentage3, 
the (Mr. Dennett's) compensation was to be a ron-
tingent compensation, ... " 
No allegation appearing in the complaint of a defimte 
term of compensation for legal services, the only basis L'l 
compensation can be reasonableness. In the Estate of Jnrr'i' 
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r r;reen I, the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt 
•" 
Lake County, State of Utah, adjudicated what constitutes a 
reasonable attorney's fee. Res Judicata pro veritate accipt-
The defendants have tendered Mr. Dennett the fee the 
District Court awarded to him. Even if defendants failed to 
tender the fee to him, Mr. Dennett's recourse is not his action 
in the case at bar but supplementary proceedings to the 
decree. 75-9-27 U.C.A., 1953. 
CONCLUSION 
The plaintiff is barred and es topped from any relief 
upon his complaint. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
L. RIDD LARSON 
Attorneys for Defendants and 
Appellants 
